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Network and Agent Dynamics with Evolving 
Protection against Systemic Risk 
 
Abstract 
The dynamics of protection processes has been a fundamental challenge in systemic risk analysis. The 
conceptual principle and methodological techniques behind the mechanisms involved [in such dynamics] have 
been harder to grasp than researchers understood them to be. In this paper, we show how to construct a 
large variety of behaviors by applying a simple algorithm to networked agents, which could, conceivably, offer 
a straightforward way out of the complexity. The model starts with the probability that systemic risk spreads. 
Even in a very random social structure, the propagation of risk is guaranteed by an arbitrary network property 
of a set of elements. Despite intensive systemic risk, the potential of the absence of failure could also be 
driven when there has been a strong investment in protection through a heuristically evolved protection level. 
It is very interesting to discover that many applications are still seeking the mechanisms through which 
networked individuals build many of these protection process or mechanisms based on fitness due to 
evolutionary drift. Our implementation still needs to be polished against what happens in the real world, but 
in general, the approach could be useful for researchers and those who need to use protection dynamics to 
guard against systemic risk under intrinsic randomness in artificial circumstances. 
 
 
Introduction 
Contemporary social elements are connected through a system of formal and informal flows of risks driven by 
complex interactions among their structures. It became clear, when seeking fundamental drivers and 
developing predictive models in order to capture the evolution of systemic risk, that research has moved to a 
new level [1]. However, as research for this paper expanded into different areas in our attempts to identify 
universal and domain specific patterns of systemic risk, profound implications for our understanding of real-
world dynamic behavior, ranging from protection processes to risk diffusion, became increasingly apparent 
[2]. Basically, the classical social network metaphor places individuals at the nodes of a network, with the 
network links representing interactions or connections between those individuals. Networks in any social 
system, however, are dynamical entities, and in this sense, the practical information of networks is 
continuously evolving [3]. Here, we developed a model of protection processes against risk diffusion, which 
along with its dynamics, is shown below. 
 
Systemic risk across a network: Systemic risk is a property of systems of interconnected components and 
can be described as system instability, caused or exacerbated by idiosyncratic events, resulting in potential 
catastrophe. Notably, in various studies, systemic risk has been blamed for high profile disaster (e.g., for 
making a significant contribution to the financial crisis of 2008) and also for being a likely cause of cascading 
failures [4]. A distinguishing feature of such risks, sometimes called network risk, is that they emerge from 
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the complex interactions among individual elements in a system or from their association with each other [3]. 
The context-varying mechanical flux on a system’s risk is actually very complex [5]. The possibility to quantify 
systemic risk and capture its size need to be performd in the face of all these distortions and patterns of the 
influences. By knowing the particular form in which an event could trigger instability or collapse an entire 
system regardless of individual capability at that point, it is possible to quantify with specificity the 
mechanisms underlying systemic risk using a computerized model. The next step is a simulation, highlighting 
how the complexity of such interconnected components underpins real-world systemic phenomena, with 
implications for individual robustness, the propagation of systemic risk, protection flow, and the collective 
behavior across networks [6]. In particular, a random connectivity pattern proved to be the key to 
understanding the structure of the network and how elements communicate with each other [7]. The 
establishment of a simple mechanism (i.e., two types of agents interacting with other within and across their 
respective social groups) was proposed [8, 9]. At the same time, it was suggested that a strategic decision 
process be added to explore the influence of a networked interaction on the agents [10]. Other properties of 
networks applied, such as the concept of evolutionary dynamics, all of which helped us to characterize and 
understand the architecture of artificial systems from the network property perspective [11, 12].  
 
Cognitive bias and heuristics: Individuals have fundamental limitations in terms of their ability to assess 
probability and situations [13]. Models based on the underlying assumption suggest that individuals perceive 
their capabilities as becoming more biased if external uncertainty is greater than expected individual capacity. 
This perception, when distributed in the population, is not quite static [14]. For example, optimal profitability 
changes if an option – which is present at a given time – has a probability of disappearing or not reappearing 
in the next unit of time [15]. If there is a low-variance and a high-variance option, the low-variance option is 
chosen at low reserves and the high-variance option at high reserves [16]. There are several assumptions as 
to why individuals do not always perceive risk accurately [17]. Evolutionary heuristics, used for the 
recognition principle, take the best anchoring and adjustment [18]: Charles Darwin’s natural selection, Egon 
Brunswik’s texture of natural environments, Roger Shepard’s mind as a mirror, Herbert Simon’s pair of 
scissors… comprehensive explanations of behavior are still most often expressed in terms of existing ‘inside’ 
the mind. The patterns of information – to which decision mechanisms may be matched – can arise from a 
variety of processes [19]. Behavior must be explained by an interaction between a heuristic and it's social, 
institutional, or physical environment: an intuitive mode in which judgements and decisions are made 
automatically and rapidly [20]. Many papers outline an approach related to research on individual rules of 
thumb, which has the advantage of fast decision-making based on little information, and also of avoiding 
overfitting [21]. Individual rules of thumb from individual provide more explicit examples of adaptation 
because individuals can be studied in the environments in which they evolved [22].  
 
Imitation and social learning: A social tool is essential [23]. Its character is vital for social well-being and 
resilience as it could be damaged or exploited, thus, formulating such a tool is challenging [24]. An unlimited 
variety of network dynamics and potentials are robust amplifiers of a cascade. It is therefore necessary to 
consider how the adaptive heuristics for inference and preference ties into a given interconnected social, 
institutional, and physical tool to produce adaptive behavior. To adequately assess the process, the progress 
must be made computationally, for example, by performing agent-based simulations of learning agents with 
evolving properties applied a coexisting macro-scale structure with individual interconnected at the micro-level 
in a network. An agent-based model can (i) capture emergent phenomena; (ii) provide a natural description 
of a pattern of behaviour; and (iii) allow realistic understanding of adaptation by incorporating behavioural 
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algorithms into network dynamics [25]. Its description deals with state per time as the determining factor in 
its allocation of neighbors scheduled for a given moment (cultural evolution). As the agents represent 
individuals that occurred from the bottom up, the actual state of their behaviour tends to be more informative 
[26]. This realistic simulation may allow the effects of agents’s different behavioral strategies to be tested and 
monitored (assessment of strategy and heuristic). As the topology of the interaction trait can lead to 
significant deviations from the predicted pattern of behaviour, it may generate various effects that mimic the 
behavior of real individuals, allowing sensible decisions to be made based on studying the interactions that an 
has in the artificially designed system [27]. Moreover, sophisticated behavioral adaptations by individuals are 
thought to reflect the power of the cultural evolutionary process, in that successful behaviors are copied by 
other individuals and then propagate strategically through imitation and social learning, rather than through 
individuals’ inherited traits [28]. We should expect individuals to have evolved a set of learning mechanisms 
that typically enables them to perform well on across a range of different circumstances [29]. These 
mechanisms encompass imitation and exploration in responding to current stimuli, subject to sensory biases, 
and learning rules regarding adjusting their behavior in response to nearby individuals.  
 
Gap statement: An individual condition of choices and opportunities is offered to account for the structure 
of the field and to reinforce their [30]. For example, evolutionary explanations regarding systemic risk show 
how optimal decision-makers are constrained to a biased estimate of their capability and that individuals do 
alter their strategy according to the perceived resource value [31]. Standard evolutionary models in complex 
environments provide potentially different biases in decision-making, exposing different experimental groups 
at different transition probabilities [32]. The computational modeling technique, however, lacks a bridge 
between the dynamics of agent nodes (of which the fundamental element is a vertex) and the emergent 
properties of networks. As most tools for laying out networks are variants of the algorithm, it is hard to use 
them to explore how conditions of a network affect the network’s dynamics [33]. While the assessment 
process is indeed capable of observing at macro-scale for input performance, approaches to addressing the 
micro-scale to simultaneously obtain more detailed insight need to be treated within the structure of the 
network itself [34]. This requires large data repositories to be combined to construct representations of 
trajectories that can be analyzed from different scales and perspectives. Indeed, the mechanisms and the 
serial algorithm that underpin our understanding of systemic risk in networked agents is still a work in 
progress. The facts might lead us to find common ground regarding integration of knowledge and 
methodologies, agreement on definitions, and reconciliation of approaches that many fields have adopted to 
study networks, all of which present the difficulties and traps inherent in interdisciplinary work.  
 
Purpose and value: To identify (a) biases in the assessment of systemic risk, (b) factors influencing these 
necessary concepts which are mentioned above. Thus, the primary purpose of this study is to examine 
mechanisms for the evolutionary origin of bias and make a heuristical assessment of protection against 
systemic risks in a contagious network. We established a modeling framework that can account for the 
quantitive measurement in agented networks, which allows us to explore on a macro-and micro-scale how 
protecting potential affects the risk potential. The mechanism tests what we can clearly state for different 
values of probability and how protection could be drawn by a set of entities against a cascading failure. To 
reach a better assessment of the risk and how to reduce it, this model not only enables us to directly observe 
the spread of failure in agented network industries but also to understand how the evolutionary heuristics 
protects against that spread. 
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Methods 
Network properties. We consider an Erdös-Rényi network [35] with a given number 𝑛 of nodes, connection 
probability 𝑝c, and resultant adjacency matrix 𝐴. Each node can be in one of two states: not failed or failed. 
All nodes are initially without failure. Agent properties. One agent is associated with each node and is 
characterized by its capital and strategy (see below). Payoff dynamics. In each time step, each agent receives 
one unit of payoff, which is added to its capital 𝑐, of which fractions 𝑓m and 𝑓p are spent on maintenance and 
protection, respectively, resulting in the updated capital 1 + (1 − 𝑓m − 𝑓p)𝑐. Failure dynamics. In each time 
step, a failure potential can originate at each node with probability 𝑝n and can propagate along each link with 
probability 𝑝l. A failure potential turns into a failure with probability 1 − 𝑝p, depending on an agent’s 
investment into protection; a possible choice is 𝑝p = 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐)). A failure lasts for one-time step 
and causes the loss of an agent’s capital. Strategy dynamics. Each agent chooses its protection level 
according to the heuristics 𝑓p = 𝑓p0 + 𝑓p1𝐶 truncated to the interval (0,1 − 𝑓m), where 𝐶 is a measure of the 
centrality of the agent’s node normalized to the interval (0,1). The strategy values 𝑓p0 and 𝑓p1 evolve through 
social learning and strategy exploration as follows. In each time step, each agent with probability 𝑝r randomly 
chooses another agent as a role model and imitates that agent’s strategy values with probability 𝑝i = 1/(1 +
exp⁡(−𝑠∆𝑐)), where 𝑠 is the strength of selection and ∆𝑐 is the difference between the role model’s capital and 
the focal agent’s capital. In each time step, each agent with probability 𝑝e randomly chooses one of its two 
strategy values and alters it by a normally distributed increment with mean 0 and standard deviation 𝜎e (see 
Supplement information for more detail). 
 
 
Results 
To observe the process of dynamics, the model uses an array as a probability of failure with a given number 
of initially influenced nodes. With the set of features regarding the protection dynamic applied according to 
the model description (see Methods), the simulation results are organized as follows; Section 1 describes the 
fundamental characteristics of risk diffusion in a random networked system. Section 2 investigates the 
framework that allows us to look the assumption in a tractable way while imposing realistic protection against 
the failure probability through social learning on agents. Section 3 characterize their stationarity from the 
observations of applied dynamics over time to see how the spread of the failure happens. 
 
 
Part1: Fundamental structure (in random network) 
 
To start with, individuals in the model are considered as vertices (fundamental element drawn as nodes) and 
a set of two elements drawn as a line connecting two vertices (the lines are called edges) depending on the 
information in the graph [usually controlled by (n, p)]. There are two parameters: the number of nodes (n), 
the probability that an edge is present (p).  
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𝐺(n=10, p=0.9)                                                                                       𝐺(n=10, p=0.2) 
 
 
→ 
𝐴𝑥 = 𝜆𝑥 
0: 0.321 
1: 0.321 
2: 0.321 
3: 0.321 
4: 0.321 
5: 0.321 
6: 0.321 
7: 0.321 
8: 0.292 
9: 0.292 
 
 
 
→ 
𝐴𝑥 = 𝜆𝑥 
0: 0.390 
1: 0.477 
2: 0.229 
3: 0.435 
4: 0.167 
5: 0.304 
6: 0.370 
7: 0.099 
8: 0.167 
9: 0.283 
 
 
Figure 1.1. A prototype of the random network with its property. Number of nodes n = 10, Connection probability p 
= 0.9 (left set), p = 0.2 (right set). At each section, the plots of the left side show the random (Erdös-Rényi) 
network created. A circle represents each node with an arbitrarily assigned label from 0 to 9, and each line 
represents a link. The plots of the middle show their adjacency matrix with its entry in row 𝑚 column 𝑛 (either 
1=black or 0=white) corresponding to its eigenvector centrality (right side).  
 
The results from Figure 1.1 follow from a standard representation in graph theory. It takes into account the 
fact that a higher-degree node has a higher chance of being connected to an agent in a simple way through 
the degree distribution. For a network artificially produced as 𝐺(𝑛, 𝑝), 𝑛 = 10 and 𝑝 = 0.9 as an example; The 
number of possible edges is in 𝑛(𝑛 − 1)/2 = 10 ∗ 9/2 = 45. The expected average of node degree is 
𝑝(𝑛 − 1) = 0.9 ∗ 9 = 8.1. To quantify the probability that a node has degree 𝑑 for all [0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ (𝑛 − 1)] note 
that a node has degree zero if nothing is connected to it. A node has a degree (𝑛 − 1) if all nodes are 
connected to it. For a node to have degree⁡𝑑 in a network with 𝑛 nodes, there must be 𝑑 ‘connections’ and 
(𝑛 − 1 − 𝑑) ‘nodes that are not connected to it.’ Since the probability of a ‘connect’ is 𝑝, the probability of a 
‘not connecting to a node’ is (1 − 𝑝). The outcome 𝑑 ‘heads’ and (𝑛 − 1 − 𝑑) ‘tails’ occurs with probability 
𝑝𝑘(1 − 𝑝)𝑛−1−𝑑, but there are ‘(𝑛 − 1) choose 𝑑’ ways in which this outcome can occur (the order of the flip 
results does not matter). The probability that a given node has degree 𝑑 is given by the binomial distribution 
(
𝑛 − 1
𝑑
)𝑝𝑘(1 − 𝑝)𝑛−1−𝑑, simply is 𝜇 = 𝑝(𝑛 − 1) which is also the average node degree. Depending on the 
degree of each node, the average path length and time between connected nodes can also be calculated. For 
small values [𝑝(𝑑)], the graph shows a small number of edges, isolated clusters, and a large different 
between path lengths and path time. For large values [𝑝(𝑑)], the graph shows almost a complete graph, and 
the path length and time shorten. In network analysis, as indicators of centrality identify the most important 
vertices (nodes) within a graph, applications include identifying the most influential node(s) in a network. The 
eigenvector centrality for node is (𝐴𝑥 = ⁡𝜆𝑥), where 𝐴 is the adjacency matrix of the network with eigenvalue 
𝜆. The principal has an entry for each of the 𝑛-vertices. The larger the entry for a vertex is, the higher the 
ranking with respect to eigenvector-centrality. With respect to the fundamental characteristic of the model, 
we implement that an individual (node) can catch a failure if one of its neighbors is infected to measure how 
cascades of failure can propagate through the network.  
 
Proposition of the cascading failure: The model uses an array (vector) as a probability of failure [𝑝 ∈ 
(0,1)] with the initially given influenced nodes (1 ≤ j ≤ N) being noted merely by (𝑝_𝑗). Each node can be in 
one of two states; not failed or failed. All nodes are initially without failure. The fundamental characteristics of 
network (determining the failure 𝑆𝑗𝑖) are obtained from each link of nodes in the current context. The 
elementary level of risk depends on the network units, which depend on the co-occurrence of the 𝑖 and 𝑗 of 
the nodes. This reflects that individuals are more biased when an individual is highly linked in its network. In 
what follows, such a probability of failure will be determined by the number of links from the node of the 
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specification scaled by⁡𝑅/𝑆. If we keep the individual characteristics as constant (𝐾). 𝑅/𝑆 is equal to the risk 
[failure probability: 𝑝 ∈ (0,1)] as a function of connectivity which was created by the eigenvector centrality for 
nodes (𝜆𝑥), and 𝑅 is just equal to 𝐾 over 𝑆 (𝑅 =⁡𝐾/𝑆). Nodes at lower (higher) links should have a lower 
(higher) connectivity with their risk, and vice versa. In other words, if we remove nodes from the network, 
the bias reduces where the links have decreased, even if they have retained their individual characteristics 
throughout the entire process. The intuition behind these results is that the higher-degree agents are more 
exposed to cascading failure risk than the lower-degree agents; this increases potential for cascading failure.  
 
 
Part 2: Protection against the failure (imposing realistic dynamics) 
 
In line with this observation, protection dynamic was applied against the risk of failure. The model 
allows an agent to make a costly investment into protection. Note that we assume the systemic risk as 
failure potential from the dynamics turns into a failure with probability 1 − 𝑝p depending on an agent’s 
investment into protection; 𝑝p = 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐)) when a failure lasts for one time step. 
 
 
High                 ←              𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥             →             Low 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
↑ 
 
 
𝑝𝑟,𝑝𝑒⁡ 
 
 
↓ 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
𝑝p = 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐)),   𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1, 𝑐p,1/2 = 1, 𝑝𝑟 =
0.9, 𝑝𝑒⁡ = 0.9 
Scenario A: large 𝑝p,max, large 𝑓p, and large 𝑐p,1/2  → enough 
protection → coexistence  
 
𝑝p = 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐)),   𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 0.1, 𝑐p,1/2 = 1, 
𝑝𝑟 = 0.9, 𝑝𝑒⁡ = 0.9 
Scenario B: small 𝑝p,max, large 𝑓p, and large 𝑐p,1/2 →  
low protection → all failure 
 
High 
 
 
↑ 
 
 
𝑐p,1/2 
 
 
↓ 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
 
𝑝p = 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐)),   𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1, 𝑐p,1/2 = 0.1, 
𝑝𝑟 = 0.1, 𝑝𝑒⁡ = 0.1 
Scenario D: large 𝑝p,max, small 𝑐p,1/2, and small 𝑓p →  
high protection → absence of failure 
 
 
𝑝p = 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐)),   𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 0.1, 𝑐p,1/2 = 0.1, 
𝑝𝑟 = 0.1, 𝑝𝑒⁡ = 0.1 
Scenario C: small 𝑝p,max, small 𝑓p, and small 𝑐p,1/2→  
less protection → coexistence  
 
Figure 2.1: Protection dynamics against systemic risk. At each section, plots of the left-hand side show the matrix 
[horizontal axis = time step from 1 to 10, vertical axis = individuals (10), color of the matrix = failure state between 
fail (red) and absence of fail (blue)]. The plots of the middle show each individuals’ parameter values at the time 
step [𝑡=10: cyan: cap=capital (𝑐), red: fail=failure, blue: inv=investment (𝑓p), green: pro=protection potential 
(𝑝p)]. The plot on the right-hand side represents individuals’ dynamics within a random network; node number = 
random label of each node, line width = eigenvector centrality, node color = states [failure (red) ←→ (gray) 
absence of failure, green = protection potential, yellow = initial structure of the state without failure and 
protection]. Initialized parameters of the simulations are: nodes 𝑛=10, connection 𝑝=0.9, p=1, 𝑓p0=0.4, 𝑓p1=0.5, 
𝑓m=0.1, 𝑠=1, 𝜇=0.0, 𝜎=0.1, 𝑝𝑛=0.1, 𝑝𝑙=0.3, 𝑡=10. 
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Framework: As a basic framework of this model, the probabilities of these plausible scenarios can be 
proved as follows: first, scenario A’s failure potential 1 − 𝑝p becomes 0.527 because protection 𝑝p is 
0.473 based on the possible choice 𝑝p is 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐)) = 1/(1 + 1/(0.9 ∗ 1)) with a given 
parameter values (𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1, 𝑐p,1/2 = 1, 𝑝𝑟 , 𝑝𝑒⁡ = 0.9, 𝐶 = 1). Second, scenario B’s failure potential 1 − 𝑝p 
becomes 0.953 because the protection 𝑝p is 0.047 based on the possible choice 𝑝p is 𝑝p,max/(1 +
𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐)) = 0.1/(1 + 1/(0.9 ∗ 1)) with a given parameter values (𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 0.1, 𝑐p,1/2 = 1, 𝑝𝑟 , 𝑝𝑒⁡ =
0.9, 𝐶 = 1). As can be seen on the right-hand-side upper plot, this scenario obtains the worst result 
corresponding to all failure as time goes by. Third, the scenario C’s failure potential 1 − 𝑝p becomes 0.95 
because the protection 𝑝p is 0.05 based on the possible choice 𝑝p is 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐)) = 0.1/(1 +
0.1/(0.1 ∗ 1)) with given parameter values (𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 0.1, 𝑐p,1/2 = 0.1, 𝑝𝑟 , 𝑝𝑒⁡ = 0.1, 𝐶 = 1). Finally, 
scenario D’s failure potential 1 − 𝑝p becomes 0.5 because the protection 𝑝p is 0.5 based on the possible 
choice 𝑝p is 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐)) = 1/(1 + 0.1/(0.1 ∗ 1)) with a given parameter values (𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1,
𝑐p,1/2 = 0.1, , 𝑝𝑟 , 𝑝𝑒⁡ = 0.1, 𝐶 = 1). As can be seen on the left-hand side of the bottom plot, this scenario 
obtains the best result corresponding to the absence of failure. Moreover, even in the observed 
coexistence scenario A (𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1, 𝑐p,1/2 = 1, 𝑝𝑟 , 𝑝𝑒⁡ = 0.9, 𝐶 = 1), our model shown in Figure 2.2 
reflects that the contagion or systemic risk is also likely to be intensified with recovery time, causing a 
significant costs of the failures. We have observed that immediate or procrastinate of intervention 
provide the associated with the propagation criteria in micro-scale for each node.  
 
Recovery time = 1 Recovery time = 5 
  
 
Figure 2.2: Protection dynamics against systemic risk with the recovery time delay. With the same initialized 
parameter values (Scenario A: coexistence), the set of the left-hand-side plots denotes no-time-delay (=1) case for 
the recovery time against the failure potential, while the right-hand set represents the time-delay (=5) case. At each 
section, plots of the left-hand side show the matrix [horizontal axis = time step from 1 to 20, vertical axis = 
individuals from 0 to 20, color of the matrix = failure state between fail (red) and absence of fail (blue)] 
corresponding to each individuals’ parameter values at the time step [t=20: cyan: cap=capital (𝑐), red: fail=failure, 
blue: inv=investment (𝑓p), green: pro=protection potential (𝑝p)]. The graph on the middle represents their dynamics 
with a random network; node number = random label of each node, node color = states (failure = red, absence of 
failure = blue). The plots on the right-hand side show the capital (upper) and failure (lower) trend according to time 
steps; marker = averaged value according to the time steps (1~20), marker size = variability, dotted line and color 
of the marker = strength (color bar) of the averaged value.  
 
Recovery rate: A sharp differentiation is possible among individuals. Obviously, such nodes that have 
immediate recovery (left-hand-side plots) seems to have potential to protect against the propagation of 
failure; on the other hand, nodes that have a malfunction (right-hand-side plots) seem to not have 
enough potential. Statistically, the simulation consists of repeated trials, with each trial having two 
possible outcomes. One of the consequences can be called failure (=red) and another can be called 
absence of failure (=blue). A probability of failure is the same for every trial, like the flipping of coins 𝑛 
number of times, as it is based on the binomial variable which we defined as this model’s basic 
structure. The probability of failures in each trial as given by [𝑃(𝑋) =
𝑛!
𝑟!(𝑛−𝑟)!
𝑝𝑟(1 − 𝑝)𝑛−𝑟 =
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𝐶(𝑛, 𝑟)𝑝𝑟(1 − 𝑝)𝑛−𝑟]. Where, 𝑛 is the total number of trials, 𝑟 is total number of failure events, and 𝑝 is 
the probability of failure on a single trial. In the plots of the left-hand side in Figure 2.2, we suppose the 
probability of absence of failure to be about zero point six and the probability of failure to be zero point 
four [from the Scenario A case probability is calculated by the number of failures from 20 time 
steps:⁡𝑓𝑗 =
ℎ𝑗
𝑁
, ℎ𝑗 = ∑ 1𝑘=1,…,𝑁;𝑋(𝑘)=𝑗 ].  
We assumed a random variable 𝑋 as being equal to the number of failures after 20-time steps. (i) One 
of the first conditions of the result is that it is made up of a finite number of independent trials. This 
means that the probability of whether we obtain failure or absence of the failure on each trial is 
independent of whether we simply obtained failure or the absence of the failure on a previous trial. 
Thus, in the case of the left-hand-side plots with recovery in every time steps (immediate intervention), 
the simulation results are made up of independent trials. (ii) Another condition is that each trial clearly 
has one of the two discrete outcomes in which the variable 𝑋 should be clearly classified as either a 
failure or an absence of the failure with (iii) a given fixed number of trials. Then (iv) the final condition 
of the probability of failure (=0.4) and absence of the failure (=0.6) on each trail is constant, which we 
have already measured on each trial from the Scenario A case. In the plots on the right-hand-side case 
in Figure 2.2, however, the probability would no longer be the same but would change from trial to trial. 
We have the variable 𝑋 which is equal to the number of failures from a designate population. This looks 
like as if it could be the same operation because, in it, each trial can be classified as either a failure or 
an absence of the failure over a fixed number of trials (=20). At the same time, there is a probability of 
the variable 𝑋 not being constant at each trial because of the recovery delay which is not made up of 
independent trials. The probability of the failure or the absence of the failure on the first trial would be 
equal to the whole number of individuals between the two simulation cases [𝑃(𝑘⁡𝑜𝑛⁡1𝑠𝑡 ⁡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙) = 0.4], but 
the probability of the second trial (and the following one) would be not the same since the simulation of 
the lower case but depends on what happened on the first trial [𝑃(𝑘⁡𝑜𝑛⁡2𝑛𝑑 ⁡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙) ≠ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡]. Simply 
put, each trial is being carried out without replacement, and this causes an exponentially large 
difference between two cases. In other words, this does not meet the independent trial condition, and 
the probability in the next trial is dependent on what happened on the previous trial. As replacement is 
not taking place, the probability of failure on each trail also is not constant, in contrast to the probability 
of the failure being constant on every trial in the case of the upper simulation [𝑃(𝑘⁡𝑜𝑛⁡2𝑛𝑑⁡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙) =
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡]. Thus, to reduce the potential ramifications from such additional losses to the others, an 
intermediate intervention in terms of recovery may be preferred to the potential damage from individual 
failures and may also guarantee that it is strategically possible to recover even large insolvent individuals 
with losses to uninsured connectors. Before the potential for failure can advance the value of their 
propagation, they must be identified, and the recovery value of the individual capital estimated.  
 
Protection level: Inspired by the plausible scenarios presented above which included recovery delay, 
we developed our focus on the parameter of (𝑓p𝑐) with a given of more individuals and time steps 
(nodes=100, 𝑡=100) without recovery delay. As will be noted, this is because of the applied function of 
𝑝p [= 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐))] on this application will be decided by [𝑝𝑟 , 𝑝𝑒⁡, 𝐶 → (𝑓p𝑐)] when we 
consider the 𝑝p,max, 𝑐p,1/2 and time delay (=1) as constants. This refers to an investment made by an 
agent (we define nodes as agents, as agents make decisions regarding investment in protection) in 
order to protect itself against the risk of failure in terms of how the failure propagation mechanism 
influence the agents’ decisions as they generate.  
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Figure 3.1 shows different evolutionary observations parameterized 𝑝p,max = 1,  𝑐p,1/2 = 0.5 as constant 
and changes only the protection values controlling imitation and exploration probabilities (𝑝𝑟, 𝑝𝑒) with 
the eigenvector centrality (𝐶). A possible scenario of the different conditions is as follows: scenario A = 
strong connection with strong imitation and exploration [𝑝p = 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐)),   𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1, 
𝑐p,1/2 = 0.5, for (𝑓p𝑐) 𝑝 = 0.9, 𝑝𝑟 = 0.9, 𝑝𝑒⁡ = 0.9], scenario B = weak connection but strong imitation and 
exploration [𝑝p = 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐)),   𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 0.1, 𝑐p,1/2 = 0.5, for (𝑓p𝑐)⁡𝑝 = 0.1, 𝑝𝑟 = 0.9, 𝑝𝑒⁡ =
0.9], scenario C = weak connection with weak imitation and exploration [𝑝p = 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐)),   
𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1, 𝑐p,1/2 = 0.5, for (𝑓p𝑐) 𝑝 = 0.1, 𝑝𝑟 = 0.1, 𝑝𝑒⁡ = 0.1], scenario D = strong connection but weak 
imitation and exploration [𝑝p = 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐)),   𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1, 𝑐p,1/2 = 0.5, for (𝑓p𝑐) 
𝑝 = 0.9, 𝑝𝑟 = 0.1, 𝑝𝑒⁡ = 0.1]. 
 
 
High                 ←              𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑝)             →             Low 
 
 
High 
 
 
↑ 
 
 
𝑝𝑟,𝑝𝑒⁡ 
 
 
↓ 
 
 
Low 
 
 
  
𝑝p = 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐)),   𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1, 𝑐p,1/2 = 0.5, 
𝑝 = 0.9, 𝑝𝑟 = 0.9, 𝑝𝑒⁡ = 0.9 
Scenario A: large 𝑝 , enough 𝑝𝑟,𝑝𝑒⁡→ symmetric → coexistence 
  
𝑝p = 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐)),  𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 0.1, 𝑐p,1/2 = 0.5, 
𝑝 = 0.1, 𝑝𝑟 = 0.9, 𝑝𝑒⁡ = 0.9 
Scenario B: small 𝑝 , enough 𝑝𝑟,𝑝𝑒⁡→ asymmetric→ small failure 
 
  
𝑝p = 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐)),   𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1, 𝑐p,1/2 = 0.5, 
𝑝 = 0.9, 𝑝𝑟 = 0.1, 𝑝𝑒⁡ = 0.1 
Scenario D: large 𝑝 , less 𝑝𝑟,𝑝𝑒⁡→ symmetric → large failure 
 
   
𝑝p = 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐)),   𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1, 𝑐p,1/2 = 0.5, 𝑝 =
0.1, 𝑝𝑟 = 0.1, 𝑝𝑒⁡ = 0.1 
Scenario C: small 𝑝 , less 𝑝𝑟,𝑝𝑒⁡→ asymmetric → small failure 
Figure 3.1: Protection dynamics against systemic risk with pattern recognition. At each section, the plot of the left-hand 
side shows the relation between protection level (𝑓p) and the eigenvector centrality which is controlled by the initialized 
random network property [𝐺(𝑛, 𝑝) → Cent = eigenvector centrality] according to time steps (100). The blue dots 
represent individuals, and the lines represent regressions at each time steps. The plots of the right-hand side at each 
section represent that large connection probability caused asymmetric pattern with the correlation between the two 
parameters. Instead, the small connection probability does not.  
 
The patterns observed from the four parametrizations give us different evolutionary patterns according 
to the time series. For small links (connection 𝑝 = 0.1) among the individuals, a weakly interacting 
pattern was observed in which the centralities were widely distributed, with strong interactions rather 
than large links (connection 𝑝 = 0.9) being observed, in which the centralities were tightly distributed. 
We also discovered that once the link thickness was driven, a strongly interacting regime emerges in the 
sense that the large connection probability caused a symmetric pattern between the centrality and the 
protection level, while the small connection probability did not. The results give us some insights into 
what possible patterns are going to be, with the artificially designated parameters being a plausible 
concept of the protection factors against the systemic risk. 
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Strategies: Following the previous observation, we now present another analytical characterization to 
see if an alternative strategy could affect the failure trend based on which strategy values 𝑓p0 and 𝑓p1 
evolve through social learning and exploration. We start this simulation with the assumption that the 
environment has a high protection (𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1), strong centrality (𝑝 = 0.9), and imitation (𝑝𝑟 = 0.9) but 
that an agent does not have enough opportunity to explore the other strategy values (𝑝𝑒⁡ = 0.1). As the 
exploration probability can cause the different protection level in 𝑓p, the parameter set assumes that a 
smaller value of ⁡𝑝𝑒⁡, turns out to be incapable of the dynamics expected to result in a protection level. 
In other words, even if all agents could chooses another agent as a role model and imitates that agents’ 
strategy values (capital) in each time step with the applied function (𝑝𝑖 = [1 + 𝑒
[−𝑠(𝜋𝑟−𝜋𝑓)]]
−1
), each 
agent could rarely alter its strategy value to the other strategy value because there is no chance of 
exploring the other strategy.  
 
  
Figure 3.2: Described protection dynamics against systemic risk with small exploration rate. The plot of the left-hand 
side shows a trend of the two strategies (𝑓p0=red, 𝑓p1=green, dashed vertical lines = variability), corresponding to 
its evolutionary trajectory (middle side of the plot: dot = averaged value, strength of the dot = time step, dashed 
horizontal and vertical lines = variability). Note that the plot of the right-hand side represents the failure (vertical 
axis) and variability (dashed vertical line) at each time step (horizontal axis). Initialized parameters of the 
simulations are: nodes 𝑛=100, connection 𝑝=0.9, capital 𝑐=1, 𝑓p0=0.3, 𝑓p1=0.3, 𝑓m=0.1, , 𝑠=100, 𝑝𝑟=0.9, 𝑝𝑒=0.1, 
𝜇=0.0, 𝜎=0.1, 𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥=1, 𝑐p,1/2=0.5, 𝑝𝑛=0.001, 𝑝𝑙=0.1, 𝑡 =100. 
 
           
Figure 3.3: Protection dynamics against systemic risk with small exploration rate. At each section, plots of the left-hand 
side show the matrix [horizontal axis = time step from 1 to 100, vertical axis = individuals from 0 to 100, color of the 
matrix = failure state between fail (red) and absence of fail (blue)]. The plots of the middle show each individuals’ 
parameter values at the time step [𝑡=100: cyan: cap=capital (𝑐), red: fail=failure, blue: inv=investment (𝑓p), green: 
pro=protection potential (𝑝p)]. The plot on the right-hand side represents the individuals’ dynamics with a random 
network; node color = states [failure (red) ←→ (blue) absence of failure, green = protection potential, yellow = initial 
structure of the state without failure and protection]. 
 
Figure 3.2 shows how different strategies for different evolution in networks with failure. For the most argued 
dilemmas of social networks, we consider the fraction of 𝑓p0 as one strategy and the fraction of 𝑓p1 as the 
other strategy, averaged over 100 individuals and time steps. We were able to find quite clear correlation 
between the parameter values (capital and failure, as well as the strategies of 𝑓p0 and 𝑓p1). The strategy of 𝑓p1 
multiplied by eigenvector centrality of the 𝐶 in particular shows different behavior. Although there is a relative 
score which assigned to the 𝑓p1 individuals based on the concept that a high eigenvector-centrality score (𝐶 ∈
0,1) contribute more than the others that have a relatively lower score, this feature does not causes the same 
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trend, and this results in an exponential decay of the trend in applied time series (plot on the left-hand side in 
Figure 3.2). The simulation results with a small exploration rate reflect that the centrality with the neighbor in 
the network conceptually matching relations of parameters expand nonlinearly with time, these densifications 
suggest that the existing structure of the network may constrain what will be happen in the next time step. 
Evidence shows that biases between parameters occur at very early stages. Hence, the probability of 
exploration (social learning), which might be another crucial factor in providing resources to violate 
expectations and lead to novel trends with high impact.  
 
 
Part3: Coevolutionary hueristics (stationary case) 
 
Regarding the influence of imitation and exploration, we expected to need to observe the evolutionary 
state in these traits (𝑓p0 and 𝑓p1). We reduced the exploration probability and its normally distributed 
increment so that the trait variabilities in 𝑓p0 and 𝑓p1 become much smaller; we did this by measuring 
these trait variabilities using trait ranges as a coefficient of variation (standard deviation decided by a 
mean) of, at most, 10% in either trait. 
 
Divergent 
 
Convergent 
 
 
→ 
  
→ 
 
 
Figure 4: Described protection dynamics against systemic risk with the different initial condition of the strategies. At each 
section (divergent and convergent), the plot of the left side shows its evolutionary trajectory [𝑓p0=vertical axis, 
𝑓p1=horizontal axis, dashed lines = coefficient of variation, dots = averaged value of the trait according to time step from 
the initial points; oranges: 𝑓p0=0.3, 𝑓p1=0.7 and blues: 𝑓p0=0.7, 𝑓p1=0.7]. The plot of the upper right side represents the 
failure (vertical axis) according to time step (horizontal axis) with two different initial points of the strategies (oranges: 
𝑓p0=0.3, 𝑓p1=0.7, blues: 𝑓p0=0.7, 𝑓p1=0.7). The plot of the lower right side shows the two simulations’ coefficients of 
variation (cv = dashed lines) of the 𝑓p values separately and their centrality (C = dotted lines) which is applied from the 
initialized random network property. Initialized parameters of the simulation is: nodes 𝑛=100, connection 𝑝=0.9, capital 
𝑐=1, 𝑓m=0.1, 𝑠=100, 𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1, 𝑐p,1/2=0.5, 𝑝𝑟=0.9, 𝑝𝑒=0.05, 𝜇=0.0, 𝜎=0.02, 𝑝𝑛=0.001, 𝑝𝑙=0.1, 𝑡=1000.  
 
The case in Figure 4 seems to show that we are observing convergence or divergence to an evolutionary 
trajectory in the trait space (𝑓p0, 𝑓p1). This makes the evolutionary phase portrait on the right-hand side 
meaningful and interesting: even though each new random seed produces a different evolutionary 
trajectory, at least the time series of outcome appears to converge. Notice we could recognize that the 
convergence was not every time but when it did not occur (the evolutionary phase portrait on the left-
hand side), there was usually such a big variance (or fluctuation). Thus, in case of when the 
convergence happens, we continue to use a coefficient of variations for the horizontal and vertical lines, 
indicating the degrees of polymorphism in the evolutionary phase portraits as we observed the plot of 
the right-hand side, and more initial conditions are added to the evolutionary phase portraits.  
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In Figure 5.1, we have followed the same non-evolutionary part of this model [seven parameters: nodes 
(𝑛), connection probability (p), maintenance (𝑓m), propagation probability at each node (𝑝𝑛), 
propagation through each link (𝑝𝑙), protection maximum (𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥), reference point (𝑐p,1/2)] except for the 
propagation probability through link (𝑝𝑙) as control parameter. We have also used the same evolutionary 
part of this model [four parameter: imitation probability (𝑝𝑟), selection intensity (𝑠), exploration 
probability (𝑝𝑒), and normally distributed increment of the exploration (𝜎)] but reduced more of the 
exploration rate as (as 𝑝𝑒=0.05) and its normally distributed increment (as 𝜎=0.015) with some 
additional simulations from other initial conditions and time steps (see the Initialize parameters in Figure 
5.1). 
 
 
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
     
 
Figure 5.1: Patterns of evolution phenotypes obtained from the different starting point of the strategies with 𝑝𝑙 
[Initialize parameters: nodes 𝑛=100, connection 𝑝=0.9, capital 𝑐=1, 𝑓m=0.1, 𝑠=100, 𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥=1, 𝑐p,1/2=0.1, 𝑝𝑟=0.9, 
𝑝𝑒=0.05, 𝜇=0.0, 𝜎=0.0125, 𝑝𝑛=0.1, 𝑝𝑙=0.01 ~ 0.1, 𝑡=4000]. The plots show their evolutionary trajectories with 
five observations including its variations [𝑓p0=vertical axis, 𝑓p1=horizontal axis, dashed lines = coefficient of 
variation, dots = averaged value of the trait according to time step from the initial points; oranges: 𝑓p0=0.3, 
𝑓p1=0.7, blues: 𝑓p0=0.7, 𝑓p1=0.7, greens: 𝑓p0=0.7, 𝑓p1=0.3, and purples: 𝑓p0=0.3, 𝑓p1=0.3]. The plots of the bottom 
side represent the failure (vertical axis) according to time step (horizontal axis) with the different initial points of the 
strategies. 
 
The coevolutionary characteristics of fixed points observed here are based on the communities with 0 < S < 
N (S=strategies, N=population) with a couple of different initial points. The phase portrait shows how the 
dynamical stability of species (𝑓p0 and 𝑓p1) evolves in that space generated by the two-dimensional systems. 
From the observation above we draw the basic kinds of intuitions with respect to the following statements. 
First, for coevolutionary communities with S > 1, comprising several initial conditions, the notion of 
convergence, which proved useful in the classification of fixed points for the general identification of 
dynamical stability as demonstrated; (i) If each strategy (=species) is convergent, the fixed point might be an 
evolutionary attractor. (ii) If one strategy is convergent and the other divergent, the fixed point might be an 
evolutionary repellor. (iii) In all cased not covered by (i) and (ii), local stability of the fixed point can be turned 
just by varying the ratio of the evolutionary rate coefficients. Next, according to the obtained coevolutionary 
trajectories (upper side of the Figure 5.1), the strategy values may still evolve in time, however, outcomes 
like failure (or capital) reach a stationary state (bottom side of the Figure 5.1) even if the trajectories from the 
strategies exhibit different behavior. Therefore, the presence of a convergence indicates the possibility of a 
stationarity of the coevolutionary process which can depend critically on detailed dynamical features of the 
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system (payoff, failure, and strategies). Finally, depicted evolutionary trajectories can be adaptive not only in 
a non-evolutionary (macro scale) controller [i.e., propagation of the failure through each link of the random 
network (𝑝𝑙)] but also in an evolutionary (micro scale) controller [i.e., normally distributed increment of the 
exploration (𝑓(𝑥|𝜇, 𝜎2) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎2
𝑒𝑥𝑝
−
(𝑥−𝜇)2
2𝜎2 | 𝑥 = 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙⁡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙, 𝜇 ∈ 𝑅 = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛), 𝜎2 > 0 =
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑⁡𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒)] when the polymorphism served as constants [i.e., the case of coexistence of failure 
and absence of failure from the eigenvector centrality (𝜆𝑥) and imitation (𝑝𝑖) high enough]. The result also 
shows that stationarity is reached by running the simulations for longer, inspired by the primary feature of the 
systemic risk simulation. Note that to check the validity of these formulas by simulation, we realized that we 
should be careful about the total simulation time; which seems that the value of variable converges to the 
stationary sates are not the same time, depending on the initial state of the parameters (failure propagation 
probability) as below.  
 
Table 1: Stationary observation with different 𝑝𝑙. 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
𝑝𝑙 = 1 1.000 0.632 0.767 0.718 0.736 0.729 0.732 0.731 0.731 0.731 0.731 0.731 0.731 0.731 0.731 0.731 0.731 0.731 0.731 
𝑝𝑙 = 0.1 0.100 0.125 0.138 0.149 0.194 0.228 0.359 0.412 0.505 0.573 0.611 0.637 0.648 0.662 0.693 0.701 0.719 0.728 0.731 
 
For the different initial probability of the 𝑝𝑙 (when 𝑝𝑛 = 0.1, 𝑛 = 10), more time is needed to reach the 
stationarity as shown in Table 1 (we used 𝑡=4,000 to achieve this). 
 
Thus, we extract the state values of 𝑓p0 and 𝑓p1, taking the average over a suitable time interval that 
only contains fluctuations around the asymptotic. 
 
 
    
Figure 5.2: Stationary observation according to time step. The plots of the upper side show their averaged 
trajectories [asterisk=initial points of the strategies, strength of the color=time steps: 𝑡=1(weak) ~ 𝑡=4000(strong), 
dots = averaged value of the trait according to time step from the initial points; upper right: 𝑓p0=0.7, 𝑓p1=0.7, 
upper left: 𝑓p0=0.7, 𝑓p1=0.3, bottom right: 𝑓p0=0.3, 𝑓p1=0.7, and bottom left: 𝑓p0=0.3, 𝑓p1=0.3]. The plot of the 
bottom left side shows the averaged outcomes value (vertical axis) of the capital (marker=◯) and the failure 
(marker=X) according to the 𝑝𝑙 (horizontal axis) with different initial points of the strategies (see legend). The plot 
of the bottom right side shows the average capital (blue) and failure (red) probability as functions of the strategies 
(𝑓p0, 𝑓p1) with three-dimensional representation. 
 
Table 2: Numerical result of the failure controlled by (𝑝𝑙 ⁡obtained⁡from⁡the⁡Figure⁡5). 
𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝑝𝑙) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑⁡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛⁡(𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒) 0.000 0.304 0.466 0.538 0.564 0.591 0.606 0.608 0.616 0.618 
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑⁡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛⁡(𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙) 1.748 0.887 0.633 0.552 0.499 0.472 0.467 0.455 0.451 0.450 
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑⁡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛⁡(𝑓p0) -0.102 0.105 0.270 0.384 0.472 0.447 0.470 0.476 0.483 0.479 
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑⁡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛⁡(𝑓p1) 0.492 0.489 0.493 0.508 0.494 0.486 0.492 0.491 0.509 0.506 
 
Although, the existence of an evolutionary attractor seems to be convergence in a certain point, we may 
not be able to say this is obvious because the trajectories do not have the same end point (upper side of 
the Figure 5.2). However, their coevolutionary trajectory fluctuations around a fixed mean value 
converge, at the same time, averaged capital and failure proportion reach a stationary state as the lower 
side of Figure 5.2 in terms of their extracted time series (𝑡=1~4,000). Concerning the outcome 
according to the time series, we suggest the numerical tests to explain the results of the stationarity 
obtained above. 
 
Proposition: Stationarity implies that if we shift time by an arbitrary finite interval, then process properties 
do not change (they neither increase nor decay). For any initial distribution, the process will converge to the 
stationary probability. Simply potential dynamics as follows; 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝑥 = ℎ(𝑥) + √2𝜚Γ(𝑡), ℎ(𝑥) = −
𝑑
𝑑𝑥
𝑣(𝑥). Where, 
ℎ(𝑥) is force, and 𝜚 is sigma. By stationarity, the result means that all variables are almost constant with a 
fluctuation force around their mean value. We considered that a system with a potential that exhibiting two 
state levels 𝐴 and 𝐵 defined by the failure simply yields; (
𝑝𝐴
𝑝𝐵
) = (
𝑝𝐴(𝑛 + 1)
𝑝𝐵(𝑛 + 1)
) = (
𝛼 𝛽
1 − 𝛼 1 − 𝛽
) (
𝑝𝐴
𝑝𝐵
), 𝑝𝐴 = 𝛼 ∗
𝑝𝐴 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑝𝐵 ,⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑝𝐵 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝐴 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑝𝐴. Alternatively, it can be written as (
𝑝𝐴(𝑛 + 1)
𝑝𝐵(𝑛 + 1)
) =
(
1 − 𝛾 𝛽
𝛾 1 − 𝛽
) (
𝑝𝐴(𝑛)
𝑝𝐵(𝑛)
). With 𝛾 = 1 − 𝛼, in this case, the stationary probability is given by (i.e., 𝛾 = 0.367, 𝛽 =
1, reflecting one of the simulation results of the failure) 𝑝𝐴 =
𝛽
1−𝛼+𝛽
=
1
1+𝛾/𝛽
=
1
1+0.368/1
=
1
1.368
= 0.731, 𝑝𝐵 =
1 − 𝑝𝐴 =
1
1+𝛽/𝛾
=
1
1+1/0.368
=
1
3.212
= 0.269. Given that 𝑝𝐴(𝑛) = 0.731, 𝑝𝐵(𝑛) = 0.269, simulation results mean 
that the state (𝑝𝐴) [and the other state (𝑝𝐵)] probabilities remain constant (convergence on average).  
 
Proofs of the failure: Let us now look at the frequency of failed agents in which we observed stationarity. 
The average number of failed agents denoted by (𝑁𝑓) and the fraction of failed agents denoted by (𝑓) 
remains constant. Suppose that at a given time, there are failed nodes (𝑁𝑓) and not failed nodes (𝑁 −𝑁𝑓) 
respectively. The number of not failed nodes at 𝑡 + 1 is given that 𝑝𝐴(𝑛) = 𝑁𝑓 = 0.731; 𝑁𝑓 + 𝑝𝑝(𝑁 − 𝑁𝑓) =
0.731 + 0.5(1 − 0.731) = 0.865 = 𝑁𝑁𝑜𝑓. Where 𝑝𝑝 denotes protection probability (arbitrarily designated as 0.5 
only for this numerical calculation); conversely, the number of failed nodes is (1 − 𝑝𝑝)(𝑁 − 𝑁𝑓) =
(1 − 0.5)(1 − 0.731) = 0.135 = 𝑁𝑓. Then, if we impose the failure potential can propagate through each link, 
and the propagation probability, 𝑝𝑙, is less than 1 (when originate probability 𝑝𝑛 = constant), this equation 
should be modified by simply replacing the 𝑝𝑝 by 𝑝𝑝
′ = 1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑝)(1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑙𝑝𝐸𝑅)
𝑁𝑓. For example, when we 
arbitrary consider the protection 𝑝𝑝 = 0.5 and failure propagation (𝑝𝑙) through the random network (𝑝𝐸𝑅) to 
be high enough 𝑝𝑙𝑝𝐸𝑅 = 0.9, the protection influenced by the failure propagation 𝑝𝑝
′  becomes small because 
1 − (1 − 0.5)(1 − (1 − 0.9)𝑁𝑓 = 0.09. On the other hand, if there is weak failure propagation like 𝑝𝑙𝑝𝐸𝑅 = 0.1, 
the protection influenced by the failure propagation 𝑝𝑝
′  becomes large because 1 − (1 − 0.5)(1 − (1 − 0.1)𝑁𝑓 =
0.95.  
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Proofs of the capital: Now we calculate the average value of capital at the stationary state. First, we 
consider the case 𝑝𝑙𝑝𝐸𝑅 = 1. It can easily be seen that the average value of capital in stationary states 
following 1 + 𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑓𝑝 − 𝑓𝑚)𝑐 = 𝑐 where 𝑐 is the average value of capital among individuals. Combining Eq. 
[updated capital: 1 + 𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑓𝑝 − 𝑓𝑚)𝑐 = 𝑐), protection probability: 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐)). Then, if we 
consider 𝑝𝑙 < 1, the protection probability 𝑝𝑝 in Eq. [1 + 𝑝𝑝(1 − 𝑓𝑝 − 𝑓𝑚)𝑐 = 𝑐] should be replaced by 𝑝𝑝
′ = 1 −
(1 − 𝑝𝑝)(1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑙𝑝𝐸𝑅)
𝑁𝑓). Thus, as we discovered that the protection probability is dependent on the failure 
propagation (𝑝𝑙) through the random network (𝑝𝐸𝑅), capital function should be modified as follows as well; as 
follows: 𝑐 = 1 + (1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑝)(1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑙𝑝𝐸𝑅)
𝑁𝑓))(1 − 𝑓𝑝 − 𝑓𝑚)𝑐. This shows that when the replaced 
protection by  𝑝𝑝
′  becomes small [1 − (1 − 0.5)(1 − (1 − 0.9)𝑁𝑓) = 0.09] because of the high enough 𝑝𝑙𝑝𝐸𝑅 =
0.9, the capital at stationary is going to be less than in the case of 𝑝𝑝
′  which becomes large because of the 
weak failure propagation 𝑝𝑙𝑝𝐸𝑅 = 0.1 [i.e., capital 𝑐 = 1 + 𝑝𝑝
′ (1 − 𝑓𝑝 − 𝑓𝑚)𝑐 =1.036 = 1+0.09(1-0.5-0.1)c < 
capital 𝑐 = 1 + 𝑝𝑝
′ (1 − 𝑓𝑝 − 𝑓𝑚)𝑐 = 1.38 = 1+0.95(1-0.5-0.1)c]. 
 
The intuition from the results at the stationarity is that even if (i) the strategy of 𝑓p0 and the strategy of 𝑓p1 
behaviors are not the same: as we can notice in the trajectories representation in Figure 5.2, while the 
strategy of 𝑓p0 increase their states according to the controlled parameter value of 𝑝𝑙 in the applied random 
network 𝑝𝐸𝑅, the other strategy of 𝑓p1 multiplied by the eigenvector centrality (𝐶) is not sensitive about their 
influence, (ii) the failure and capital show clear correlation according to the controlled parameter value 
change as we observed in Figure 2 and 3. Moreover, (iii) its impact seems to be much more significant in the 
early stage of the state following called a power law.  
 
Generalization of the obtained outcomes; This characteristic is of course not just restricted to this 
simulation controlled by the 𝑝𝑙 but is given the more general name of the network effect; every time someone 
links to a particular node on a network, it makes it that bit more likely that someone else will also; 𝑝𝐸𝑅 
determined by their connection probability. We expend our interest specifically in the 𝑝𝑐 [when propagation 
probability (𝑝𝑙 = 0.1) constant] because the interpreted function of 𝑝𝑝
′ = 1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑝)(1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑙𝑝𝐸𝑅)
𝑁𝑓) was 
not only dependent on the failure propagation (𝑝𝑙) but also through the random network (𝑝𝐸𝑅) property [from 
the eigenvector centrality (𝜆𝑥) controlled by the connection probability (𝑝𝑐)]. And we could observe a quite 
similar trend of their outcomes as we observed in the simulation results controlled by the 𝑝𝑙.  
 
 
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
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Figure 6.1: Patterns of evolution phenotypes obtained from the different starting point of the strategies with 𝑝𝑐 
[Initialize parameters: nodes 𝑛=100, connection 𝑝=0.1~0.9, capital 𝑐=1, 𝑓m=0.1, 𝑠=100, 𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥=1, 𝑐p,1/2=0.1, 
𝑝𝑟=0.9, 𝑝𝑒=0.05, 𝜇=0.0, 𝜎=0.0125, 𝑝𝑛=0.1, 𝑝𝑙=0.1, 𝑡=4000]. The plots show their evolutionary trajectories with 
five observations including its variations [𝑓p0=vertical axis, 𝑓p1=horizontal axis, dashed lines = coefficient of 
variation, dots = averaged value of the trait according to time step from the initial points; oranges: 𝑓p0=0.3, 
𝑓p1=0.7, blues: 𝑓p0=0.7, 𝑓p1=0.7, greens: 𝑓p0=0.7, 𝑓p1=0.3, and purples: 𝑓p0=0.3, 𝑓p1=0.3]. The plots of the bottom 
side represent the failure (vertical axis) according to time step (horizontal axis) with the different initial points of the 
strategies. 
 
 
   
Figure 6.2: Stationary observation according to time step. The plots of the upper side show their averaged 
trajectories [asterisk=initial points of the strategies, strength of the color=time steps: 𝑡=1(weak) ~ 𝑡=4000(strong), 
dots = averaged value of the trait according to time step from the initial points; upper right: 𝑓p0=0.7, 𝑓p1=0.7, 
upper left: 𝑓p0=0.7, 𝑓p1=0.3, bottom right: 𝑓p0=0.3, 𝑓p1=0.7, and bottom left: 𝑓p0=0.3, 𝑓p1=0.3]. The plot of the 
bottom left side shows the averaged outcomes value (vertical axis) of the capital (marker=◯) and the failure 
(marker=X) according to the 𝑝𝑐 (horizontal axis) with different initial points of the strategies (see legend). The plot 
of the bottom right side shows the average capital (blue) and failure (red) probability as functions of the strategies 
(𝑓p0, 𝑓p1) with three-dimensional representation. 
 
Table 3: Numerical result of the failure controlled by (𝑝𝑐 obtained from the Figure 6). 
𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝑝𝑐) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑⁡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛⁡(𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒) 0.000 0.338 0.474 0.558 0.592 0.604 0.612 0.612 0.617 
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑⁡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛⁡(𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙) 1.582 0.839 0.591 0.508 0.479 0.462 0.455 0.454 0.451 
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑⁡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛⁡(𝑓p0) -0.155 0.170 0.291 0.405 0.432 0.481 0.487 0.488 0.492 
𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑⁡𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛⁡(𝑓p1) 0.497 0.500 0.492 0.497 0.510 0.504 0.506 0.496 0.506 
 
Figure 6 shows that the scatter plot which is constructed by the connection probability (𝑝𝑐) do obey strong 
power-law relationships like the previous observation 𝑝𝑙 (see the fixed mean value of the failure in Table 2 
and Table 3). In order to interpret the potential state variable (placed as a probability) according to the 
control parameters of 𝑝𝑐 compared to the 𝑝𝑙, let us use a simple way [going back to the primary feature of 
the failure which mentioned in the section of Cascading failure in the network (𝑅 =⁡𝐾/𝑆)] to specify this detail 
with numerical test. Intuitively, we assume that the parameter value of 𝑝𝑙 or 𝑝𝑐 can be considered as the 
main variable (𝑥 = 𝑝𝑙𝑝𝐸𝑅) in this case and cannot equal zero since the [𝑝𝑙 ∈ (0,1), 𝑝𝑐 ∈ (0,1)]. Yielded 
function would be [𝑓(𝑥) = ⁡𝑘/𝑥, 𝑥 ≠ 0] as simply as possible to explain what happens. We assumed the 
denominator of the fraction as domain [greater than zero (𝑥 > 0)] which is from the probability of the failure 
propagate through each link (𝑝𝑙 in case of the Figure 5), at the same time from the probability of the 
connection in the random network (𝑝𝐸𝑅 determined by 𝑝𝑐 in case of the Figure 6). If we keep the nominator 
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of the fraction as constant (𝑘) which can be from an inherited fitness for every individual at the time, and plus 
one more value in that each agent receives one unit of payoff in each time steps (𝑐 = 1: corresponding to the 
model’s payoff dynamics), such that function will be [𝑓′(𝑥) = −(𝑘/𝑥) + 𝑐].  
 
Table 4: Numerical result of the function [𝑓′(𝑥)]. 
𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝑥) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
𝑓′(𝑥) 0.000 0.500 0.666 0.750 0.800 0.833 0.857 0.875 0.888 0.900 
 
In what follows, such a range [𝑓′(𝑥)] will be decided by the failure propagate through each link in the random 
network (𝑝𝑙𝑝𝐸𝑅) which was determined by both parameters (𝑝𝑙 and 𝑝𝑐) with the same weight. We simply 
proved this numerical trend about the defined protection probability by 𝑝𝑝
′ = 1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑝)(1 − (1 − 𝑝𝑙𝑝𝐸𝑅)
𝑁𝑓) 
must be the similar by the 𝑝𝑙 [when the 𝑝𝐸𝑅 = constant (Table 2)] as well as by the 𝑝𝑐 [when the 𝑝𝑙 = 
constant (Table 3)]. Thus, failure influences in these simulations are almost identical as we obtained in the 
Table 2.1 according to these parameters change including where increase or decrease occurs following a 
nonlinear curvature of the power law.  
 
This interpretation helps to illustrate the dynamics behind how these propagations through the system can 
move or develop in a particular direction as many real-world networks (such as finance, supply chain, and 
disease etc.) have proven this power law relationship between size and quantity. We should note here again 
applied potential in here can go in a short period of time which we might cite as a bias or rationality. The 
inspiration from this observation and interpretation is to get a sense of the qualitatively different nature of 
propagation within systems that the failure is not just growth or decay, but due to the network effect over 
time, there is also another rate that is itself increasing the risk. This statistical core of the phenomena played 
an additioanl part in the underlying phase transitions across a wide range of the system in this model.  
 
 
Part4: Summary of the results 
 
We tested the model we created by conducting simulations on random network graphs generated as 
follows: the network property for each occupies a vertex (drawn as a node); the edge (illustrated as a 
line connecting two vertices) marks the nearby sites where a reproducing individual can place an 
offspring. With respect to the property of this network, the rest of the graph is organized as follows: the 
size of the node denotes the number of edges incident on a node (drawn as a degree); the width of the 
edges represents an influence based on that connection (drawn as an eigenvector centrality) which 
randomly chooses each neighbor. The potential of the systemic risk then propagates through failure 
dynamics as does the artificially designated probability with the initial event of the invading failure. 
Proper protection against the systemic risk with the system components evolving heuristically through 
strategy dynamics (social learning and exploration) as a potential for absence of failure.  
 
Notice how it all came about and what the results mean to us. The model mechanism assumes that any 
individual that has a failure would devastate the whole system. Every one of them is in the situation of 
being what is called systemically essential, and all these will systemically cascade. Let us specify what 
the simulation mechanism would say to reflect this point. First, there is a (a) contagion. If one individual 
(=node) fails because of its interconnected relationship in a network (for example, an industry) its 
failure will have an impact on other individuals in the industry. There is thus a contagion type of effect 
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(reflected by links). Second, there is a (b) concentration. In the industry, even it only one player or small 
entity with a massive potential is more extensive than all the others, there will be a significant 
concentration (reflected by the eigenvector centrality). Third, there is a (c) context, namely, what 
usually happens to an individual’s function in an ordinarily operable environment; if the circumstance 
takes a turn for the worse, perhaps so too will all other individuals, as all of these individuals and 
institutions are in context (reflected by social learning and imitation). Any individual in the industry 
functions in the same way. It also takes the same kinds of risks as others take. Thus, if one goes down, 
they all go down. We observe a significant correlation between capital and failure at both the micro- and 
macro-scale, which is another critical fact. Note that if an individual without protection goes in the 
direction eliminating the risk through investment, every single individual in that context will go to fail. 
 
Another potentially important factor in these results is a cultural evolution and the dilemma it poses for 
imitation and exploration through social learning. The random probability controls the influence, and the 
impact depends on the choice between arbitrary designated strategies (𝑓p0 and 𝑓p1) among the 
individuals through social learning and exploration. The output suggests that failure might be a critical 
driver for bias with a given centrality, social learning, and exploration. Evolutionary heuristics remains 
the dominant measurable unit of credit in any dynamics. Given the reliance of most plausible principles 
on the network, the dynamics of accumulated strategies has been scrutinized by generations of 
explorations. From fundamental work connected with this model, we know that the normally distributed 
increment of explorations with respect to protection level is highly skewed. Many studies are never 
proved, and this uneven exploration distribution is a robust, emergent property of the dynamics of the 
systemic risk propagation. This means that we can compare the impact of protection level biased in 
different strategies by looking at their relative exploration rates.  
 
In Figure 5, we have used the same parameters to picture the combined dynamics of trait substitution 
sequences in two coevolving strategies originating from different initial conditions. At any moment in 
time, two coefficients of variation were calculated from the simulations by dividing the standard 
deviations of 𝑓p0 and 𝑓p1 by their respective means. We plot these as functions of time, which yield two 
curves for one initial condition in the plot, one for 𝑓p0 and the other for 𝑓p1, with time on the horizontal 
axis and the coefficients of variation on the vertical axis. We added some additional simulations from 
other initial conditions. The main point of interest here is whether they all do converge to the 
stationarity. Of course, each new random seed produces a different evolutionary trajectory, as we 
mentioned above, but as our previous time series of failure proportions appear to converge, so the 
update with more initial conditions has converged to an asymptotic value in a certain parameter setting. 
The results show that individuals outcomes (failure and bias) at the stationarity follows a power law 
whose tails can be called a preferential attachment in network dynamics [36].  
 
 
Discussion 
We present a simple general model to quantify the protection that will be used to mitigate systemic risk, 
with results as follows: First, (i) the model introduces the nature of network property. Then (ii) it 
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suggests a prototypical failure impact which is needed for projecting the common risk exposure onto the 
set of individuals. In a last step, (iii) the model implies how protection can be applied to the network; 
then (iv) it simultaneously combines theses coevolutionary features. As detailed above in Methods, the 
present model treated a couple of results as factors in a fully undirected random design specified in the 
model structure and the dynamics of these simulations together with corresponding diversifications. 
Based on the simple set of property, the observations from this model highlight the fact that the 
probability describes the portion of protection which, from between nodes in the networks, can be 
characterized by how systemic risk should be coped with, rather than it being predicted by the 
probability of failure [37]. The broad spectrum of emergent behavior encapsulated in networks that have 
connectedness and spreading may be explained as follows. 
 
Systemic risk: First, the simulations show that there is a vast variety of phenomena with random 
connections that arbitrarily act as robust amplifiers for the failure initialization. Many of those original 
properties are structurally simple (specifically, there are certain subset of vertices that we could call a small 
world because of their topology) but also strong (due to the influence based on those connections), and these 
could be realizable in other network structures such as regular and cycle in a fixation time of mutants [38]. 
The result provides an explicit procedure for their properties, proving the existence of those structures. The 
arrangement guarantees that, with high probability, the fundamental properties or influences spread along a 
branch corresponding to their universal characteristics at the macro-scale. The connection of all edges is then 
intensified so that the spreading repeatedly invades, and eventually failure spreads through the links one-by-
one to all the branches until a cascade occurs at the micro-scale. Intuitively, the degree assignment creates a 
sense of primary flow, directed toward the initial failure which demonstrates that once the failure reaches the 
high centrality, the agents are highly likely to persist in invading more neighbors. Thus, if we know the 
starting links and finishing links of the node, we might be able to assess the risk in the network system. We 
can suggest that the risk emerges through common conditions caused by the relations of the node. The 
intuition is that, because we did estimate with the immutable characteristics, if we remove links on the node 
to the system, the specification must be added to the system, and the value of links will be equivalent to the 
systemic risk, as we saw in the simulation result. We observed that the underlying networks had created 
random pathways along which failure events can spread rapidly and globally, which we might call systemic 
risks. In this perspective, we argue that systemic failures are consequences of the highly interconnected 
systems (connection probability) and networked risks (failure probability) that individuals have created. Such 
interdependencies will inevitably get out of control, and a network-oriented view can understand the 
instabilities.  
 
Protection potential: Second, the simulation model explicitly regulates the potential of the protection to the 
systemic risk by interconnected dynamics. As can be seen in the result part of 1 (a feature of systemic risk), it 
is not possible to predict or control the potential for catastrophic failure even though all the information may 
be embedded in the system at the macro-scale (=universal application of the parameters). Such problems 
might be solved by suitable management applications [and proper (re)design of the structure]. We 
constructed a suite of plausible dynamics, decentralized bottom-up mechanisms, by establishing appropriate 
‘rules of the interaction’, within which the system components can self-organize, including mechanisms 
ensuring rule compliance (vectorized micro-scale implementation). Evolutionary dynamics, for example, can 
often promote a well-balanced situation with respect to the interactions. When the investment into protection 
is weak (low investment), a pattern of strong systemic risk emerges as agent failure in networked conditions. 
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In contrast, when the investment into protection is strong (high investment), a pattern of protection emerges, 
with a little diversification against all challenges. The results cast light on the modes of propagation. Observed 
contagion and persistence patterns should be viewed not as a direct causal link, but rather as due to an 
accumulated rational driven by interconnectedness [20]. Moreover, the failure potential is also due to time 
delays after an individual is officially failed [39]. Governments or politics are often reluctant to resolve 
insolvent institutes (i.e., banks, firms, supply chains etc.) and they permit the individuals to continue 
operating amid negative effects. The length of these delay causes not only increased failure but also capital 
losses, which is more likely for insolvent or near-insolvent individuals, leading to reductions in network 
welfare. These delays may at times stretch to many others in the network, increasing the fragility and the 
probability of failure [40]. Many pieces of evidence in most governing systems do indeed suggest that if 
troubled individuals could be estimated before the value of their capital turned negative, institutions, based on 
their risk potential would be permitted to weed out the inefficient or unfortunate individuals to protect against 
more serious adverse effects [41]. This reinforces the importance of resolving individuals as quickly as 
possible and developing faster procedures for certifying protected individuals by providing immediate 
interventions. On the other hand, prompt corrective actions may increase the willingness to supply such 
protection to reduce the chances of systemic risk [42]. Given the evolutionary mechanisms implemented in 
this simulation model, we observed the evolutionary response many times in order to obtain a critical value 
for the plausible protection potential. We demonstrated that although the structures have high failure 
potential in terms of the systemic risk, the function of the interconnection turns them into weak amplifiers, 
where profitable investment with high protection.  
 
Strategy dynamics: Third, the simulation shows that cultural evolutions are key features of 
investment for protection against the spread of failure. Namely, the results confirmed that without either 
exploration through social learning, no strategy is a robust amplifier under the propagation of failure and 
no investment is a high enough one to achieve an absence of failure under the contagion. We notice 
that clear potential, such as cultural evolution, can be turned into arbitrarily powerful amplifiers, and the 
results of experiments on the strategy dynamic vary the fitness advantages for the protection. 
Depending on the investment into protection through the bottom-up dynamics, it is possible to find 
individuals’ strong bias [43], who alter their competitive strategy [14], that have a large potential for 
protection, and that reconcile the networked agent’s broad range of the systemic risk values as basics of 
their interconnected interactions. In particular, inspired by the plausible scenarios which we presented, 
we focusd on the parameter of (𝑓p𝑐) with more individuals and time steps. The results give us some 
insights into the fact that the regime in the strongly centralized but weakly with interactions between 
individuals might be not recommendable in the current model mechanism, and that biases might be 
mitigated by exploration if there is enough social learning. Shifting away from the existing dominant 
potential, norms, and routines can be productive by leading to novel trends with high impact. Evidence 
shows that biases between parameters occur at very early stages— hence, the exploration (social 
learning) probability and rates that could be another crucial factor offering resources to violate 
expectations and leads to novel trends with high impact. Following the observations, we can assume 
that successful outcomes require there to be a delicate balance across the essential components 
(structure, centrality, social learning, and exploration). To be valuable, individuals and organizations 
might seek legitimacy to reduce their perceived risk potential by associating with this finding. Although 
many questions remain regarding how different network structure, governance, and content evolve and 
interact over time, resources help to gauge the underlying potential. Observation in this simulation may 
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lead to a subsequent beneficial network structure being engendered in social relations that is jointly 
supported by governance. 
 
Coevolutionary features: Finally, there has been some interest in the general question as to whether 
the phenotypes evolve as an evolutionarily stable strategy [44, 45]. According to researcher [46], the 
interaction between strategies prevents the attainment of a converging point, such that there is a 
continuous evolutionary change in their phenotypes [47]. Inspired by the investigation process of this 
model, we thus utilized the three dynamics of coevolution (payoff, failure, and strategy) to investigate 
the variety of possible evolutionary traits in a random network. In particular, we focused on the potential 
for stationarity and observed that this mode of coevolution is a feasible outcome. In Figure 5, it is seen 
that the adaptive trait values tend to a converging trend, as, once this is reached, no further fluctuations 
occur around the fixed mean value. This finding corroborates speculations put forward regarding the 
necessity for such interactions to motivate a variety of phenotypic coevolution. Such dynamics are 
interpreted as indicating the continuous deterioration of a strategy’s environment owing to the continual 
evolution of other strategies [48]. Analysis of these interpretations suggests that, through evolution, the 
phenotypes could either tend to convergent or to divergent asymptotic states. We have seen in the 
results that in a random network a variety of evolutionary outcomes is possible. According to the 
framework established here, we ensure that the process of directing evolution is driven explicitly by the 
interactions of different phenotype, these being the events that arise from encounters with other 
individuals [49], as opposed to the constant birth and death events. We assume that variation is created 
by an interconnected evolutionary process; to keep the analysis tractable, we envisage that the various 
functions could be used for this purpose; the main function describing the effect of that individual is 
likely to show some degree of specialization in the features of stationarity. In the case of the 
simulations, we can immediately infer from observations that there is a region in the monomorphic trait 
space where the strategies can coexist [50]. Such volatility can be governed not only through quantified 
non-evolutionary part but also by identifying the evolutionary part of the strategies, such as individuals’ 
imitation and exploration as they aim to increase their protection [51]. Furthermore, emerging 
phenomena measured by the interconnected contributions obey that power law like other network 
systems follow [52]—which a mathematical formula fits well to plausibly explain the likely outcomes 
[36], and the probability distributions based on the individual characteristics can play a prominent role in 
discourses about their potentials [53]. 
 
Concluding remarks: Research on systemic risk has yielded many remarkable findings. Our 
observations indicated that successful outcomes do indeed seem to require a balance across objects. 
From empirical results, there is also a consensus that embeddedness in a network of interrelations 
matters for the network’s payoff and performance [54]. In contrast, only a partially oriented 
confirmation was conducted for a network dynamic, although the report alone does not tell the full story 
[55]. Critically scanned uncertainty needs to be addressed to answer questions as to how content 
network relationships, governance, and structure emerge over time [56]. With a random network-agent 
model, we notice that the proposed “protection dynamics” leads to a restructuring of the systemic risk 
that is practically free of failure. The principle, being simple but fundamental, does not ordinarily change 
across individual; hence, we suggest that this is a straightforward and easy model which can be used for 
finding invariant properties and provide an example so that it can be used when needed. Rules and 
process implemented in this study would provide a fresh way for decision-makers (or social planner) to 
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gain a better perspective in the dynamics of systemic risk. With a simple network behind this model 
consisting of two types of agents, an interesting direction for future research will be motivated by 
whether comparable results can be achieved for systemic-risk. We could enhance the prospects of 
systemic risk as a whole to more effectively address its related problems [12] by attempting to eradicate 
an infection on the optimal actions of a decision making. 
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Supplement information of the Model 
Mathematical description of the mechanisms 
In computation, there are rules of thumb that we can implement into an algorithm to help it solve many 
problems. These usually do not work in every case, and we do not need them to. We need them to work for a 
problem to which we have devoted more effort to optimize them. One case to which we have given great 
attention is linear programming. The fundamental idea is that we have a matrix 𝐴, a vector 𝐵, and we want 
to find vectors such that i.e., 𝐴𝑥 is less than or equal to 𝐵; 
 
{𝑥 ∈ ℝ𝑛|𝐴𝑥 ≤ 𝐵}, ℝ𝑛 = 𝑛⁡𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑙⁡𝑠𝑒𝑡⁡𝑜𝑓⁡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙⁡𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 
 
Here, each entry of vector 𝐴 is the corresponding entry of vector 𝐵, which shows up all the time in 
optimization. The heuristic here is if we have a problem that we really want to solve because of the amount of 
effort that people have put into it, we could try reducing it to one of these problems and plugging it into the 
solvers that exist. Instead of giving ourselves a hard task, we reduce our problem to find a reduction in 
programing in which the existing algorithms can work well, such that linear programing can take advantage 
about many case complexities of algorithms.  
 
Systemic risk in the random network: We put forward the proposition regarding the emerging protection 
and its potential far-reaching impacts on agented-network under the basic operating principle mentioned 
above. We therefore suggest the following steps for modelling. First, (network properties) when constructing 
the basic data structure, the functionalities of the mechanism begins with a specific undirected relationship 
between agents. Next, (primary risk influence) using a parameter to evaluate the impact of risk for the 
networked agents, the influence of primary risk is estimated along the structure as a general failure property. 
Finally, (protection against systemic risk) embedding a protection dynamic by emphasizing the role of payoff, 
failure, and strategy dynamics. 
 
The structure created (network) is undirected and starts by adding edges between pairs of nodes one at a 
time randomly (Erdös-Renyi graph). For example, 4 nodes (vertices) added possible edges (line); 
 
Network (undirected) 
Label 
 
0=A,  
1=B,  
2=C,  
3=D 
 
Pairs of nodes 
 
AB = BA 1 
AC = CA 0 
AD =DA 0 
BC = CB 1 
BD = DB 1 
CD = DC 1 
 
Describing a graph by an adjacency matrix: If we start with the idea of an adjacency matrix, we think of the 
rows of the matrix as well as the columns of the matrix to be labelled by the vertices (nodes), so here we 
have 1, 2, 3, & 4 vertices. The actual labelling that we give can be anything but let us call our adjacency 
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“matrix A” and this is the actual definition of our matrix. An entry in row⁡𝑚 column 𝑛 will be equal to either 1 
or 0. It will be equal to 1 if there is an edge between 𝑚 and 𝑛 and if 𝑚 is not connected to 𝑛, it will be zero 
 
𝐴𝑚 × 𝑛 =
1
2
3
4
1⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡4
[ ], 𝐴 = {
1⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖𝑓⁡𝑚𝑛⁡ ∈ 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒
0⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
The diagonal elements of the adjacency matrix are zero for graphs without loops. 
 
𝐴 =
1
2
3
4
1⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡4
[
0 1 0 0
], 𝐴 =
1
2
3
4
1⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡4
[
0 1
0
0 0
0
0
], 𝐴 =
1
2
3
4
1⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡4
[
0 1
1 0
0 0
1 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
1 0
] 
 
The graph which will be discussed here will not have loops (to itself) on a single node. In an adjacency 
matrix, rows and columns represent vertices (nodes), so the sum on each row (column) is the degree of 
the related node. For the above example, the vertex 2 has 3 neighbors. For the columns of the matrix: 
 
𝐴 =
1
2
3
4
1⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡2⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡3⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡4
[
0 1
1 0
0 0
1 1
0 1
0 1
0 1
1 0
], deg
(𝑣2𝑚) = 3, deg(𝑣2𝑛) = 3 
 
If we look at the column that represents the vertex 2 we will also get 3 which represents its degree. So, 
keep in mind that the adjacency matrix of a graph has all the same information that is contained in the 
graph. Notice that the graph has been shown to us in any random way that the computer generates the 
visuals. If we were to run again, we would get a different picture but no matter how we run it, the same 
relationship between those vertices (nodes) and edges (line) creating its degrees will be the same as 
below;  
 
∑ deg(𝑣) =
𝑣∈𝑉(𝐺)
⁡deg(𝑣1) + ⋯+ deg(𝑣𝑛) = 2|𝐸(𝐺)| 
 
states that twice the number of edges equal to its sum of the degrees (i.e., E=4=deg=8) as we can see 
in the pair of nodes. In every graph twice, the number of edges [2|𝐸(𝐺)|] is the sum over the degree of 
nodes [deg(𝑣1) + ⋯+ deg(𝑣𝑛)] or the sum over matrix elements. 
 
𝐴 = [
𝑎11 𝑎12
𝑎21 𝑎22
⋯ 𝑎1𝑛
⋯ 𝑎2𝑛
⋯ ⋯
𝑎𝑚1 𝑎𝑚2
⋯ ⋯
⋯ 𝑎𝑚𝑛
] 
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The resulting 𝑚 × 𝑛 matrix is obtained by [𝐴 = 𝐺(𝑛, 𝑝)], any node can be randomly exposed to the other 
nodes, which creates random connections. Given the collection of nodes influenced by the connection 
probability [𝑝 ∈ (0,1)], the model asks what the distribution of the connection in the network is 
(probability of degree). 
Next, to observe the process of propagation, the model uses an array (vector) as a probability of failure 
[𝑝 ∈ (0,1)] with a given initially influenced nodes (1 ≤ j ≤ N) noted merely by (𝑝_𝑗). Each node can be in 
one of two states; not failed or failed. All nodes are initially without failure.  
Because, the previous mechanism was; 
 
𝐴 = [
𝑎11 𝑎12
𝑎21 𝑎22
⋯ 𝑎1𝑛
⋯ 𝑎2𝑛
⋯ ⋯
𝑎𝑚1 𝑎𝑚2
⋯ ⋯
⋯ 𝑎𝑚𝑛
] 
 
Extending the above output given the failure dynamics becomes; 
 
𝐴 = [
𝑎11 𝑎12
𝑎21 𝑎22
⋯ 𝑎1𝑛
⋯ 𝑎2𝑛
⋯ ⋯
𝑎𝑚1 𝑎𝑚2
⋯ ⋯
⋯ 𝑎𝑚𝑛
] [
?⃗?1
?⃗?2
⋯
?⃗?𝑛
] = [
𝑎11?⃗?1 ⁡⁡⁡+ 𝑎12?⃗?2 ⁡⁡⁡+
𝑎21?⃗?1 ⁡⁡⁡+ 𝑎22?⃗?2 ⁡⁡⁡+
⋯ 𝑎1𝑛?⃗?𝑛
⋯ 𝑎2𝑛?⃗?𝑛
⋯ ⋯
𝑎𝑚1?⃗?1 ⁡⁡+ 𝑎𝑚2?⃗?2
⁡⁡+
⋯ ⋯
⋯ 𝑎𝑚𝑛?⃗?𝑛
] = 𝐵?⃗? = [
𝐵?⃗?1
𝐵?⃗?2
⋯
𝐵?⃗?𝑛
] 
 
i.e., States Matrix 
[[ 1., 1., 1., 1., 0., 0., 1., 1., 1., 1.], 
 [ 0., 0., 0., 1., 1., 1., 1., 1., 1., 1.], 
 [ 0., 0., 0., 0., 0., 0., 0., 0., 0., 0.], 
 [ 0., 0., 0., 0., 1., 1., 1., 1., 0., 0.], 
 [ 0., 0., 0., 0., 1., 1., 1., 1., 1., 1.], 
 [ 0., 0., 0., 1., 1., 1., 1., 1., 1., 0.], 
 [ 0., 0., 0., 0., 0., 0., 0., 0., 0., 0.], 
 [ 0., 0., 1., 1., 1., 1., 1., 1., 1., 1.], 
 [ 0., 0., 0., 0., 0., 0., 0., 0., 0., 1.], 
 [ 0., 0., 0., 0., 0., 0., 1., 1., 1., 1.]] 
 
Notice that the matrix is denoted by an 𝐵?⃗? instead of an 𝐴 be representation because it no longer 
follows the adjacency matrix representation. The 𝐵?⃗? is still going to be labelling our rows and columns 
via 1 and 0, the key difference is being the possibility of showing the state of each node (𝑚 : 1= failure, 
0 = absence of failure) according to time steps (𝑛). 
 
Impose protection against the systemic risk: Along with the basic intuition mentioned above, 
protection dynamics was applied. First of all, we break the program into sub-dynamics (payoff, failure, 
and strategy). The result of each sub-dynamics is saved. These sub-dynamics are trivial problems that 
add complexity to the dynamics. To implement each part, we use simple equations. These equations 
combine some previously computed variables, and newly added or computed variables. In the following 
example, we used the values already stored in the table to compute new variables. This technique is 
often called memorization.  
For example; 
 
a → store in the table 
b → store in the table 
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a + b = c → lookup a, b → compute c 
d → stored in the table 
a + d = e → lookup a, d → compute e 
 
Payoff dynamics: One agent is associated with each node and is characterized by its capital and strategy 
as below; In each time step, each agent receives one unit of payoff, which is added to its capital 𝑐, of 
which fractions 𝑓m and 𝑓p are spent on maintenance and protection, respectively, resulting in the 
updated capital 1 + (1 − 𝑓m − 𝑓p)𝑐. We used an element-wise computation by using arrays for the 
vectorization (?⃗?) instead of using a loop. 
 
𝑓p = ?⃗?𝑖 = [
?⃗?𝑖1
?⃗?𝑖2
⋯
?⃗?𝑖𝑛
] , 𝑓m = ?⃗?𝑖𝑖 [
?⃗?𝑖𝑖1
?⃗?𝑖𝑖2
⋯
?⃗?𝑖𝑖𝑛
] , ?⃗?𝑖𝑖 + (−)?⃗?𝑖 = [
?⃗?𝑖𝑖1 + (−?⃗?𝑖1)
?⃗?𝑖𝑖2 + (−?⃗?𝑖2)
⋯
?⃗?𝑖𝑖𝑛 + (−?⃗?𝑖𝑛)
] = [
?⃗?𝑖𝑖𝑖1
?⃗?𝑖𝑖𝑖2
⋯
?⃗?𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛
] ,
𝑐 [
?⃗?𝑖𝑖𝑖1
?⃗?𝑖𝑖𝑖2
⋯
?⃗?𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛
] = [
𝑐?⃗?𝑖𝑖𝑖1
𝑐?⃗?𝑖𝑖𝑖2
⋯
𝑐?⃗?𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛
] = [
?⃗?1
?⃗?2
⋯
?⃗?𝑛
] 
 
Because the previous initial random network property was;  
𝐴 [
𝑎11 𝑎12
𝑎21 𝑎22
⋯ 𝑎1𝑛
⋯ 𝑎2𝑛
⋯ ⋯
𝑎𝑚1 𝑎𝑚2
⋯ ⋯
⋯ 𝑎𝑚𝑛
] + 𝑘𝐴 [
𝑘𝑎11 𝑘𝑎12
𝑘𝑎21 𝑘𝑎22
⋯ 𝑘𝑎1𝑛
⋯ 𝑘𝑎2𝑛
⋯ ⋯
𝑘𝑎𝑚1 𝑘𝑎𝑚2
⋯ ⋯
⋯ 𝑘𝑎𝑚𝑛
] = 𝐵, 𝑘 ∈ [0,1] 
The applied output given payoff dynamics becomes; 
 
𝐵 = [
𝑏11 𝑏12
𝑏21 𝑏22
⋯ 𝑏1𝑛
⋯ 𝑏2𝑛
⋯ ⋯
𝑏𝑚1 𝑏𝑚2
⋯ ⋯
⋯ 𝑏𝑚𝑛
] [
?⃗?1
?⃗?2
⋯
?⃗?𝑛
] = [
𝑏11?⃗?1 ⁡⁡⁡+ 𝑏12?⃗?2 ⁡⁡⁡+
𝑏21?⃗?1 ⁡⁡⁡+ 𝑏22?⃗?2 ⁡⁡⁡+
⋯ 𝑏1𝑛?⃗?𝑛
⋯ 𝑏2𝑛?⃗?𝑛
⋯ ⋯
𝑏𝑚1?⃗?1 ⁡⁡+ 𝑏𝑚2?⃗?2
⁡⁡+
⋯ ⋯
⋯ 𝑏𝑚𝑛?⃗?𝑛
] = 𝐵?⃗? = [
𝐵?⃗?1
𝐵?⃗?2
⋯
𝐵?⃗?𝑛
]⁡⁡ 
 
Where the vector (?⃗? = payoff_dynamics) components is equal to matrix B. Simply this product is equal 
to 𝐵?⃗?. 
 
Failure dynamics: A failure potential can originate at each node with probability 𝑝n ∈ [0,1], and it also 
propagates along each link with probability 𝑝l ∈ [0,1] in each time step. Failure potential turns into a 
failure with probability 1 − 𝑝p, depending on an agent’s investment into protection; a possible choice is 
[𝑝p = 𝑝p,max/(1 + 𝑐p,1/2/(𝑓p𝑐))].  
Where the protection (𝑝p) is equal to the applied (saturation) function. 𝑝p,max is a designated protection 
maximum, the 𝑐p,1/2 denotes an allocated reference point, and the 𝑓p𝑐 represents an evolutionary 
protection level multiplied by the updated capital. 
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𝑝p = ?⃗⃗?𝑖 = [
?⃗⃗?𝑖1
?⃗⃗?𝑖2
⋯
?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖𝑛
] , 𝑓p = ?⃗?𝑖 [
?⃗?𝑖1
?⃗?𝑖2
⋯
?⃗?𝑖𝑛
] , 𝑓p𝑐 = 𝑐 [
𝑐?⃗?𝑖1
𝑐?⃗?𝑖2
⋯
𝑐?⃗?𝑖𝑛
] 
 
The applied output given failure dynamics becomes; 
 
𝐵 = [
𝑏11 𝑏12
𝑏21 𝑏22
⋯ 𝑏1𝑛
⋯ 𝑏2𝑛
⋯ ⋯
𝑏𝑚1 𝑏𝑚2
⋯ ⋯
⋯ 𝑏𝑚𝑛
] [
?⃗⃗?1
?⃗⃗?2
⋯
?⃗⃗?𝑛
] = [
𝑏11?⃗⃗?1 ⁡⁡⁡+ 𝑏12?⃗⃗?2 ⁡⁡⁡+
𝑏21?⃗⃗?1 ⁡⁡⁡+ 𝑏22?⃗⃗?2 ⁡⁡⁡+
⋯ 𝑏1𝑛?⃗⃗?𝑛
⋯ 𝑏2𝑛?⃗⃗?𝑛
⋯ ⋯
𝑏𝑚1?⃗⃗?1 ⁡⁡+ 𝑏𝑚2?⃗⃗?2
⁡⁡+
⋯ ⋯
⋯ 𝑏𝑚𝑛 ?⃗⃗?𝑛
] = 𝐵?⃗⃗? = [
𝐵?⃗⃗?1
𝐵?⃗⃗?2
⋯
𝐵?⃗⃗?𝑛
]⁡⁡ 
 
Where the vector (?⃗⃗? = failure_dynamics) components is equal to matrix B. Simply this product is equal 
to 𝐵?⃗⃗?. Under this section, a pre-written function (Erdös-Renyi) was used to make a short iterate 1=D 
array for vectorization (?⃗⃗?) instead of using the adjacency matrix directly. This substitution made the loop 
shorter. Failure lasts for one-time step and causes the loss of an agent’s capital. 
 
Strategy dynamics: Each agent chooses its protection level according to the heuristics 𝑓p = 𝑓p0 + 𝑓p1𝐶, 
truncated to the interval (0,1 − 𝑓m). 
 
?⃗? → 𝑓 → 𝑓(?⃗?),⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑓(?⃗?) = {
0 < ⁡𝑓(?⃗?) < 0.9, 𝑓m = 0.9
0 < ⁡𝑓(?⃗?) < 0.1, 𝑓m = 0.1
,⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡ ?⃗?|𝑓p=𝑓p0+𝑓p1𝐶 
 
For initialization of the strategy values, two arrays have been added for vectorization [(𝑓p0 = ?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖), (𝑓p1𝐶 =
𝐶?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖)]. 
 
⁡𝑓p0 = ?⃗⃗⃗? = [
?⃗⃗⃗?1
?⃗⃗⃗?2
⋯
?⃗⃗⃗?𝑛
] , 𝑓p1𝐶 = 𝐶?⃗⃗⃗? [
𝐶?⃗⃗⃗?1
𝐶?⃗⃗⃗?2
⋯
𝐶?⃗⃗⃗?𝑛
] ,⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐶 ∈ [0,1]⁡ 
 
Where the ?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖1 is a vectorization as the designated strategy of (𝑓p0) and the ?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖𝑖 is a vectorization as the 
designated strategy of (𝑓p1) multiplied by eigenvector centrality from the Erdös-Renyi graph (𝐶) which is 
a measure of the centrality of the agent’s node normalized to the interval (0,1). 
 
𝑓p0 = ?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖 = [
?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖1
?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖2
⋯
?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖𝑛
] , 𝑓p1𝐶 = 𝐶?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖 [
𝐶?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖1
𝐶?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖2
⋯
𝐶?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖𝑛
] , ?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖 + 𝐶?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖 = [
?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖1 + 𝐶?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖1
?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖2 + 𝐶?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖2
⋯
?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖𝑛 + 𝐶?⃗⃗⃗?𝑖𝑛
] = 𝑓p = [
?⃗?𝑖1
?⃗?𝑖2
⋯
?⃗?𝑖𝑛
] 
 
Eigenvector centrality for node i is (𝐴𝑥 = ⁡𝜆𝑥), where 𝐴 is the matrix of the network with eigenvalue 𝜆. 
The strategy values 𝑓p0 and 𝑓p1 evolve through social learning and strategy exploration as follows. In each 
time step, each agent with probability 𝑝r ∈ [0,1]  randomly chooses another agent as a role model and 
imitates that agent’s strategy values with probability (𝑝i = [1 + 𝑒
−𝜔∆𝜋]−1, 𝜋𝑟 −⁡𝜋𝑓 = ∆𝜋|⁡𝜋𝑟=𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒⁡𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙). 
Where 𝑝i is the probability acceptance of the role model for imitation, 𝜋𝑓 is a capital of the focal 
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individual, 𝜋𝑟 is a capital of the role individual, 𝑒 denotes the exponential, and 𝜔 is the intensity of the 
selection (𝜔 < 1 = weak selection, 𝜔 → ∞ = strong selection). The focal individual imitates the strategy 
of the nearby role individual, comparing its new capital (large ∆𝜋 = capital difference large, small ∆𝜋 = 
capital difference small), and then the focal individual chooses to imitate the strategy of the role 
individual. Regarding this imitation part, a temporary matrix was used to avoid changing and using 1 
matrix in the loop.  
Finally, in each time step, each agent with probability 𝑝e ∈ [0,1]  randomly chooses one of its two 
strategy values alters it by a normally distributed increment with mean 0 and standard deviation 𝜎e 
[𝑓(𝑥|𝜇, 𝜎2) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎2
𝑒𝑥𝑝
−
(𝑥−𝜇)2
2𝜎2 | 𝑥 = 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙⁡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙, 𝜇 ∈ 𝑅 = 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛),⁡⁡⁡⁡𝜎2 > 0 =
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑⁡𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒)]. 
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2. Tables of the model parameters 
 
Imitation probability      𝑝𝑟  ∈ (0,1) 
Selection intensity      𝑠  ∈ (1,100) 
Exploration probability      𝑝𝑒  ∈ (0,1) 
Normally distributed increment     𝜎  ∈ (0,1) 
Table 1. evolutionary part (four parameters). 
 
Number of individuals (nodes)     𝑛  ∈ (1,100) 
Connection probability      p  ∈ (0,1) 
Maintenance       𝑓m  ∈ (0,1) 
Propagation probability at each node    𝑝𝑛  ∈ (0,1) 
Propagation probability through each link   𝑝𝑙  ∈ (0,1) 
Protection maximum      𝑝𝑝,𝑚𝑎𝑥  ∈ (0,1) 
Reference point       𝑐p,1/2  ∈ (0,1) 
Table 2. Non-evolutionary part (seven parameters). 
 
Time periods       𝑡  1 ~ 10,000 
Recovery rate       𝑟_𝑡  1 ~ 10 
Recovery time delay      𝑡_𝑟  1 ~ 10 
Realization        𝑡𝑡  1 ~ 100 
Table 3. Time-dependent part (four parameters). 
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3. Code book (Python) 
#==================================================================
============ 
# CREATED NETWORK 
#==================================================================
============ 
n = 100        # n = number of nodes 
p = 0.9       # p = connection probabilty [c ∈ (0,1)] 
G = nx.erdos_renyi_graph(n, p)   # create random graph 
A = nx.adjacency_matrix(G)    # resultant adjacency matrix 
C = nx.eigenvector_centrality(G)       # calculate eigenvector_centraliity. 
 
#==================================================================
============ 
# INITIAL PARAMETERS 
#==================================================================
============ 
B                    = np.zeros((n,4))    # create matrix to store parameters 
failure_potential    = np.zeros(n)        # create another matrix to store influence 
protection_potential = np.zeros(n)      # create another matrix to store protection potential 
fp                   = np.zeros(n)        # create another matrix to store protection level 
capital = 1                           # initial capital 
 
# for strategies 
fp0 = np.random.normal(0.7, 0.01, size=[n])  #strategy of the one(mean, SD, size=n) 
fp1 = np.random.normal(0.7, 0.01, size=[n])   #strategy of the other(mean, SD, size =n) 
 
# for protection  
Centrality = np.array(list(C.values()))    # copying C's values to make an array from a dictionary 
fp = B[:,1] + B[:,2] * Centrality   # for protection level 
fm = 0.1               # for maintenance 
 
# for imitation dynamics  
s = 100                  # selection intensity 
pr = 0.9                 # imitation probability 
 
# for exploration dynamics  
pe = 0.05                # exploration probability  
mu = 0.0                 # mean for normally increment  
sigma = 0.01             # standard deviation for normally increment 
 
# for failure dynamics 
pn = 0.1                 # with this, a failure potential can originate at each 
node  
pl = 0.1                    # with this, a failure potential can propagate along 
each link 
 
# for saturation function 
pmax = 1                 # for protection maximum 
cp   = 1               # for reference point (=cp,1/2) 
 
# for recovery rate 
rec1 = 1.0               # always reset (failure potential) 
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rec2 = 1.0               # never reset  (failure) 
 
# fore recovery time delay 
failtime    = 1                       # determines the number of timesteps 
failtimear  = np.zeros(n)            # during which a node is failed 
failidx     = []                      # index of failed nodes 
 
# for time steps and realization 
timePeriod = 4000          # time period 
realization = 1      # repeats of the simulation 
 
 
#==================================================================
============ 
# MODEL'S DYNAMICS 
#==================================================================
============ 
for real in range(realization):     #REALIZATION LOOP 
     
    #--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    # Initial condition 
    #-------------------------------------------------------- 
    B[:,0]  = capital     # initialized capital for all individual within the loop 
    B[:,1]  = fp0      # strategy of the one for all individual within the 
loop 
    B[:,2]  = fp1      # strategy of the other (fp1*C) for all individual 
within the loop 
    B[:,3]  = 0                           # 0 -> not fail | 1-> fail: initially without failure 
 
    for t in range(0, timePeriod + 1 ):    # loop for time steps 
        temp = B                                      # a temporarily variable to save strategies 
 
        #---------------------------------------------------------------     
        for i in range(n):       # loop for every individual within the t loop 
 
            #------------------------------------------------------- 
            # imitation 
            #========== 
            """Each agent with probability pr randomly chooses another agent as a role model and imitates that 
agent's strategy values with probability pi.""" 
            R1 = np.random.random()                 # randomly choose a certain(%) only 1 time 
            if R1 <= pr:                               # conditional   
                ff = i                                 # focal model (each node i) 
                while True:     # it is true 
                    rr  = np.random.choice(n)         # randomly choose role model 
                    if ff != rr:     # until focal choose a different role model 
                        break     # exit out of the loop 
                pi = 1 / (1 + (np.exp(-s*(B[rr,0]-B[ff,0]))))  # calculate (fermi) function 
                R2 = np.random.random()    # randomly choose a certain(%) only 1 time 
                if R2 <= pi:                           # conditional  
                        temp[ff, 1:3] =  B[rr,1:3]     # imitate the role model 
        B[ : , 1 : 3] = temp[ : , 1 : 3]               # update strategy values 
        #------------------------------------------------------- 
        # exploration 
        #============ 
        """Each agent with probability pe randoly chooses one of its two strategy values and alters it by a 
normally distributed increment with mean (0) and SD (sigma)""" 
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        temp      =   B[:,1:3]       # a temporarily variable to save 
strategies 
        R3        =   np.random.random(size = [n, 2]) <= (0.5 * pe)  # randomly choose a certain(%) 
with conditional 
        temp[R3] +=   np.random.normal(mu, sigma, size = [n,2])[R3]  # normally distributed increment 
        B[:,1:3 ] =   temp       # update strategy values 
 
        #------------------------------------------------------- 
        # capital 
        #======== 
        """Each agent chooses its protection level according to the heuristics fp=fp0+fp1*C truncated to the 
interval (0,1 -fm), where C is a measure of the centrality of the agent's node normalized to the intervalu 
(0,1)""" 
        fp = B[:,1] + B[:,2] * Centrality                  # for heuristics of the protection level 
        fp[fp < 0]        = 0                               # for truncation of the interval (0) 
        fp[fp > (1 - fm)] = 1 – fm     # for truncation of the interval (0,1 - fm) 
        """Each agent receives one unit of payoff, which is added to its capital c, of which fractions fm and fp 
are spent on maintenance and protection, respectively, resulting in the updated captial 1 + (1 - fm - fp)*c""" 
        B[:,0]= 1 + (1 - fm - fp) * B[:,0]            # resulting in the updated capital 
 
        
#==================================================================
======== 
        # FAILURE DYNAMICS 
        
#==================================================================
========           
        """A failure potential can originate at each node with (pn) ,and can turn into a falure with (1 - pp). 
Failure potenital propagates along each link with (pl), by a failed node""" 
        R4 = (np.random.random(n) <= pn)     # randomly choose a certain(%) 
with conditional 
        failure_potential[R4] = 1     # conditional if it is 
        for i in range(n):      # loop for every individual within the loop 
with conditional 
            if B[i,3] > 0:                              # if node failed 
                neighbors = nx.all_neighbors(G, i)    # apply network property 
                for j in neighbors:                   # find out link of the node (neighbor linked 
by connection) 
                    R5 = np.random.random()     # randomly choose a certain(%)  
                    if R5 <= pl:       # if it is (conditional) 
                        failure_potential[j] = 1       # do this (failure potential goes to)  
 
        #--------------------------------------------------------------- 
        # failure potential in neighbors can turn into failure 
        #===================================================== 
        """A failure potential turns into a failure with probability 1-pp, depending on an agent's investment into 
protection pp=ppmax/((1+cp,1/2)/(fpc))""" 
 
        B[:, 3]   = 0       # node failed 
        protection_potential = np.zeros(n)    # conditional  
        index     = (failure_potential   >    0 )    # return as (true or false) for all 
individuals  
        protection_potential[index]        =  (pmax / (1 + cp/(fp[index] * B[index,0]))) # index true goes to  
        protection_potential[ np.isnan(protection_potential ) ] = pmax # conditional 
        R6        = ((np.random.random(n) <=  1 - protection_potential) & index)  # randomly choose a 
certain(%) with conditional 
        B[R6, 3]  = 1      # individuals with index true, becomes 1 
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        B[R6, 0]  = 0         # individuals with index true, becomes 0 
 
        #------------------------------------------------------- 
        # reset failure potential and/or failures 
        #======================================== 
        """A failure lasts for one time step and causes the loss of an agent's capital: reset failure potential 
and/or failure""" 
        R7     = np.random.random(n)     # randomly choose individuals with 
a certain(%)  
        index  = R7 < rec1                        # indexing with conditional  
        failure_potential[index] = 0              # individuals with index true, becomes 0 
(reset the value) 
 
 
 
 
